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EUROPEAN AXIS MANPOWER SUMMARY:

THE OVER-ALL MANPOWER POSITION

Description

Manpower estimates for the various countries of Europe.

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EUROPEAN AXIS MANPOWER SUMMARY:
THE OVER-ALL MANPOWER POSITION[1]

I. THE MANPOWER POSITION OF GREATER GERMANY

Although the Germans have conquered territories having a population far greater than that of the Reich itself, the manpower resources mobilized inside Greater Germany continue to be the effective overall limit on German economic capabilities. Even more important, German reserves of combat manpower are exhausted, and as a consequence the German armed forces are declining in overall effectiveness.

It is estimated that 10.8 million German men and one million foreigners were called into the German armed forces between May 1939 and June 1944, in addition to 1.7 million already under arms at the earlier date. This drain has been compensated for, at least in numerical terms, by the recruitment of foreign workers, the employment of prisoners of war and disabled veterans, and the more intensive use of the German civilian population.

The Germans have called into the armed forces about 70 percent of the males between the ages of 18 and 44, inclusive, and about 80 percent of those in the age group 18 to 34 from

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1. See also R & A 2523.5 and 2523.6, The German Armed Forces and The German Civilian Labor Force.

which the best combat troops are drawn.

The group 18 to 34 will decline significantly in size as time passes, since the classes becoming 18 are smaller than those becoming 35. It is clear that future casualties will have to be replaced largely with older men.

Every man able to work is active either in the civilian labor force or in the armed forces. Among men over 65 and women over 45, almost one-third are gainfully active. Not far from 60 percent of women aged 18 to 44 are in the labor force. Among the remaining 40 percent, almost all who are fit are undoubtedly engaged in essential household duties. As the rate of gainful activity of all adult groups was already very high in 1939, there has been little increase since then.

Table 1. GREATER GERMANY: MANPOWER RESOURCES AND MANPOWER USE, MAY 1939 AND JUNE 1944

(In thousands of persons)

		17 May 1939			
		Total Population (1)	Armed Forces (2)	Gainfully Active Civilians (3)	Others (4)
I. MALES					
A	Under 14.....	8,668	. . .	96	8,572
B	14 and under 18..	2,710	37	2,161	512
C	18 and under 30..	7,263	1,635	5,386	242
D	30 and under 45..	9,502	21	9,260	221
E	45 and under 65..	7,742	4	6,687	1,051
F	65 and over.....	2,876	. . .	857	2,019
G	TOTAL.....	38,761	1,697	24,447	12,617
II. FEMALES					
H	Under 14.....	8,361	. . .	84	8,277
I	14 and under 45..	19,714	. . .	10,892	8,822
J	45 and over.....	12,539	. . .	3,948	8,591
K	TOTAL.....	40,614	. . .	14,924	25,690
L	Disabled veterans	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
M	Net increase in foreign civilians	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
N	Prisoners of war	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
O	GRAND TOTAL.....	79,375	1,697	39,371	38,307

Table 1 (continued)

(In thousands of persons)

		1 June 1944			
		Total Population (5)	Armed Forces (6)	Gainfully Active Civilians (7)	Others (8)
I.	MALES				
A	Under 14	8,869	. . .	86	8,783
B	14 and under 18...	2,423	549	1,406	468
C	18 and under 30...	3,039	2,341	467	231
D	30 and under 45..	8,336	3,410	4,696	230
E	45 and under 65...	8,028	300	6,942	786
F	65 and over.....	3,265	. . .	1,039	2,226
G	TOTAL.....	33,960	6,600	14,636	12,724
II.	FEMALES				
H	Under 14.....	8,575	. . .	77	8,498
I	14 and under 45..	19,384	. . .	11,378	8,006
J	45 and over.....	13,624	. . .	4,374	9,250
K	TOTAL.....	41,583	. . .	15,829	25,754
L	Disabled veterans	1,780	. . .	1,410	370
M	Net increase in foreigners.....	6,950	800	6,150	. . .
N	Prisoners of War	2,150	. . .	2,150	
O	GRAND TOTAL....	86,423	7,400	40,175	38,848

II. POPULATION AND GAINFUL ACTIVITY RATES OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1 JANUARY 1944.

From 1940 through most of 1943 Germany occupied all of Europe west of the Soviet front and made effective use of the manpower resources of this area. For this reason a consideration of the labor supply situation within Germany presented only part of the picture. Germany was able to counterbalance labor deficiencies at home not only by recruiting foreigners for labor in Germany but also by using foreign workers in their home countries.

Since late 1943 Germany has been withdrawing from conquered territory. The manpower resources of these areas are lost to Germany, and the consequent sabotage, unrest and disorganization and emphasis on defense in the yet occupied territories leaves Germany little in the way of net gains. Thus the population estimates and gainful activity rates in Table 2 do not indicate what is now available to Germany.

Table 2. POPULATION AND GAINFULLY ACTIVE POPULATION OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1 JANUARY 1944

Country[a]	National Population 1 January 1944[b]	Percent gainfully active, latest census[c]
(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Albania	1,112,000	----
B. Austria	6,583,000	46.9
C. Belgium	8,331,000	43.3
D. Bulgaria	6,509,000	55.6
E. Czechoslovakia	15,418,000	47.5
F. Denmark	3,956,000	45.2
G. Finland	3,805,000	50.7
H. France	40,873,000	52.4
I. Germany	68,482,000	49.4
J. Greece	6,431,000	44.2
K. Hungary	9,385,000	44.1
L. Italy	45,562,000	41.7
M. Lichtenstein	12,000	----
N. Luxemburg	305,000	----
O. Netherlands	9,217,000	40.1
P. Norway	2,997,000	41.5
Q. Poland	35,000,000	52.4
R. Portugal	7,848,000	43.8
S. Rumania	17,009,000	58.4
T. Spain	25,948,000	37.2
U. Sweden	6,499,000	47.1
V. Switzerland	4,306,000	47.5
W. Yugoslavia	14,089,000	46.5

a. Pre-Munich boundaries except where otherwise indicated.
b. These are projections of the latest census figures on the basis of actual births and deaths or latest available vital rates. They are not resident populations: no deductions have been made for population out of the country (civilian workers, refugees, deportees, etc.) nor additions for migrants into the country (German administrative personnel, foreign workers, etc.). The assumption is that such population will speedily return to its native country upon the close of hostilities. (Although it is realized that such an assumption is not valid in the case of deported or refugee populations, there is no accurate way to determine just what proportion of such populations will be unable or unwilling to return.) Deductions have been made for military or excess civilian deaths when known; these are footnoted separately.
c. Gainfully active rates, except those for Rumania and Yugoslavia, are from Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reichs, 1937, p. 37. Rates for Rumania and Yugoslavia are from ILO Yearbook, 1942, p.5.

NOTES TO TABLES

Table 1.

Line and/or column

A-1 Through G-1, census data. Wirtschaft und Statistik, No. 23 for 1940, p. 519.

-2 Through G-2. Derived by adding the figure for uniform long-term members of the armed forces to the figure for conscripts. Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1 October 1941, cites a census figure of 464,000 for officers, under officers and long-term enlisted personnel of the Wehrmacht, leaders of the Reichsarbeitsdienst, leaders and men of the armed units of the SS and SA, and Church officials. We have subtracted 40,000 Church officials, the 1933 figure being 36,000, to get the figure for permanent armed forces. The age distribution of the above was estimated. The figures for conscripts were derived by subtracting census figures for male population without conscripts from census figures for the total male population. Ibid., No. 23 for 1940, pp. 526-527.

-3 Through C-3. As per census, Ibid., No. 18 for 1941, p. 158 after subtracting out uniformed long-term members of the armed forces.

The slight difference between G-3 and the final census figure in Table 1, R & A 2532.6, The German Civilian Labor Force, is due to the fact that the age distribution is available only in a preliminary form.

-4 Through G-4. Derived by subtracting A-2 plus A-3 from A-1.

-5 Through G-5. Projection of census data minus estimate of permanent losses as per our obituary study. See R & A 2532.5, The German Armed Forces, Tables 2 and 3.

B-6 Estimated by taking 95 percent of the males 17 years of age minus the estimated number of permanent losses in that age group.

NOTES TO TABLES

Table 1 (continued)

Line and/or column

C-6 Estimated by taking 90 percent of the males in this group minus the estimated number of permanent losses in this group.

D-6 Estimated by taking 60 percent of the males in this group minus the estimated number of permanent losses in this group.

E-6 Estimated by taking the remainder of the estimated number mobilized minus the estimated number of permanent losses in this group.

G-6 Sum of B-6 through E-6.

A-7 through G-7. Derived by applying the age specific gainful activity rates prevalent in May 1939 to the estimated population in 1944 and subtracting therefrom the estimated number mobilized.

-8 through G-8. Derived by subtracting A-6 plus A-7 from A-5.

H-1 through K-1. Census data loc. cit., No. 23 for 1940.

-3 through K-3. Census data, loc. cit.

-4 through K-4. Derived by subtracting B-3 from B-1.

-5 through K-5. Projection of census data, Ibid No. 8 for 1941.

-7 through K-7. Projection of census data, loc. cit., plus an estimated 675,000 additional internal recruitment in the age group 14-45.

-8 through K-8. Derived by subtracting B-7 from B-5.

NOTES TO TABLES

Table 1 (continued)

Line and/or column	
L-5	As per estimate of permanent losses to the armed forces. See R & A 2532.5, The German Armed Forces, Table 2.
-7	Estimated by taking 90 percent of those who become unfit for service with the armed forces, with a six-month time lag for unfit due to battle causes and a two-month time lag for unfit due to non-battle causes.
-8	L-5 minus L-7.
M-6	R & A estimate.
-7	See R & A 2532.6, The German Civilian Labor Force, Table 2.
N	See R & A 2532.6, The German Civilian Labor Force, Table 3.
O-6	See R & A 2532.5, The German Armed Forces.

Table 2.

A-2	After deduction of 9,000 excess civilian deaths.
B-2	After deduction of 251,000 military deaths.
C-2	Military deaths appear to be included in published deaths, so have not been estimated separately.
E-2	After deduction of 129,000 military deaths (Sudeten) and 43,000 excess civilian deaths.
G-1	January 1941 boundaries.
G-2	After deduction of 55,000 war dead.
H-2	After deduction of 124,000 killed in combat; excess of deaths over births since January 1940 has amounted to 560,000 as compared to natural decrease of 42,000 for 1938 and 36,000 for 1939.

NOTES TO TABLES

Table 2 (continued)

Line and/or column

I-1 Altreich, including the Saar.

I-2 After deduction of 2,620,000 military deaths and 100,000 excess civilian deaths.

J-2 After deduction of 22,000 military deaths and 52,000 civilian deaths caused by hostilities; excess of deaths over birth since October 1940 has been 730,000, as compared with a natural increase of 69,000 in 1939.

L-2 After deduction of 300,000 military deaths and 25,000 civilian deaths (air-raid victims).

O-2 After deduction of 10,000 excess civilian deaths (air-raid victims): military deaths appear to be included in published deaths, so have not been separately estimated.

P-2 Preliminary estimate.

R-1 Including the Azores and Madeira.

S-1 Not including Bukovina and Bessarabia.

S-2 After deduction of 75,000 military deaths.

T-1 Including the Canary and Balearic islands.

W-2 After deduction of 240,000 killed during the period of official hostilities and immediately afterwards; excess of other deaths over births since 31 March 1941 has been 989,000 as compared with a natural increase of 171,000 in 1939.